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Abstract: 
The Black Sea is one of the most important geostrategic enclaves in the oil and gas 
connection linking Asia with Europe and Russia. However, the presence of Turkey 
on the Bosphorus Strait directly affects how the geo-strategic interactions of the 
region develop. 
The crisis in Ukraine has spurred Turkish-Russian relations, positioning the 
country as a key player in the gas transit to Eurasia and projecting the aspirations 
of the Kremlin, under President Vladimir Putin has sought to regain an influential 
weight in the region - as shown by the crisis in Georgia or, more recently, Crimea - 
especially in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.
Thus, the following work seeks to put a little light on new relationships and 
geopolitical aspirations, especially in Russia and Turkey and, likewise, have a 
direct impact on the European context.
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Resumen: 
El Mar Negro se trata de uno de los enclaves geoestratégicos de mayor importancia 
en la conexión gasífera y de petróleo que une Asia y Rusia con Europa. Sin embargo, 
la presencia de Turquía sobre el estrecho del Bósforo afecta directamente a cómo se 
desarrollan las interacciones geoestratégicas de la región. 
La crisis en Ucrania ha espoleado las relaciones turco-rusas, posicionando al 
país como un actor clave en el tránsito del gas hacia Eurasia y proyectando las 
aspiraciones del Kremlin que, bajo el mandato de Vladimir Putin, ha buscado 
recuperar un peso influyente en la región – como muestran las crisis de Georgia o, 
más recientemente, de Crimea – especialmente en el Mar Negro y el Mar Caspio.
Así, el siguiente trabajo busca poner un poco de luz en las nuevas relaciones y 
aspiraciones geopolíticas, especialmente de Rusia y Turquía y que, igualmente, 
repercuten directamente sobre el escenario europeo.
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The Black Sea has turned out to be a strategic milestone regarding the gas and oil transit from Asia and 
Russia towards Europe. Indeed, there is a rollback in order to exploit the oil and gas wells located over 
there. According to that, Turkey's control of the Bosphorus Strait reshuffles and shapes the geopolitical 
scenario. Once locked the pipelines through Ukraine, Turkey has gained power in accordance to 
negotiate with Russia and control the gas transit such as one of the main hubs to Eurasia. 
The Ukrainian conflict has underpinned a complex roadmap between Russia and the Eastern 
European countries. Whether in 2008 the invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia built up a framework 
of impunity and its non recognized secession revealed a fracture within the International Legal System, 
the United Nations Security Council and the International Community,  the ongoing conflict in Ukraine 
has reinforced and increased the gap between Russia and most of the permanent members of the UNSC. 
The illegal secession of Crimea in March 2014 to the Russian Federation has impinged the International 
Treaties and has deepened the Russian impunity and independence within the international political 
and legal system.  
During the last decades, Russian policies have been focused on regaining its power and recover its 
geopolitical predominance in East Europe and the Middle East. On this basis, the Black Sea has been 
and remains as an important milestone and Russia has lobbied for setting up important framework 
agreements with Turkey, the Black Sea's and the Caspian Sea's countries, for instance Georgia or 
Armenia. Crimea has been and It is hitherto a crucial achievement in order to cope the military and 
economic interests of the region (Dempsey, 2015).
The agreements outreached with Ukraine for settling down Russian vessels and military fleets in 
Sevastopol, the last one the Kharkiv Treaty signed until 2042, shifted Russian predominance in this 
region and empowered Russia's aspirations to surpass a critical geopolitical checkpoint in accordance to 
grasp the Middle East and Eastern Europe's control (Luke, 2010).
Turkish energy supplies heavily relied on Russian gas and oil imports and the establishment of the 
Blue Stream pipeline crossing the Black Sea has reinforced the Russian empowerment in the region 
controlling this path (Bacin, 2001). 
Turkish pipelines represent a prior strategic keystone on Russian policies. That's why the ongoing 
war in Ukraine and the invasion of Crimea and its artificial independence have underlined Turkey's 
importance and willingness in order to stabilize the region. Russian military deployment in Ukraine 
represents as well a threat to Turkey in its Black Sea backyard. 
2.  Backs and forths among Turkey and Russia
The ongoing and historical relations amid Moscow and Ankara have been remarked by differences and 
approaches (Tanrisever, 2012). The Black Sea's policies have drawn and highlighted a cut and thrust 
relations between both nations. Within the Cold War, their bilateral relations reached a tension's peak 
due Turkey was aligned with the USA and the NATO's system. The USSR's shut down shifted the 
economic and political scope. Thereby, Russia mellowed its regional relations in order to accomplish an 
economic recovery and to soften the impact of the USSR's division and the independence of its Baltic 
Republics, Ukraine and the step down of its Iron Curtain (Özdal et al., 2013).
In accordance to that situation, Russia's Heartland was seriously affected and its economic and 
political dynamics changed drastically reshuffling the geopolitical map (Mackinder, 1904), establishing 
hereinafter a win-win bilateral economic relation with Turkey. Russian policies were focused on 
regaining its power and recover its geopolitic predominance in East Europe and the Middle East, albeit.
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On behalf of that, Andrei Kortunov, director of the 
Russian Council, underlines the possible win-win scenarios 
on the Turkish – Russian relations. The first one settles down 
a cooperative and collaborative relation, establishing 
interactive and functional agreements in order to tackle 
possible common threats. The second scenario is focused on 
strengthening their bilateral and regional-level
cooperation, balancing their interests on the political 
and economic sphere. This association may enhance the 
ongoing relations one step further in the economic, political 
and social realms. Actually, the energy relations between 
Russia and Turkey are accurately related to that theory. 
On this basis, supporting Kortunov's theories, Turkish 
authors believe that the forthcoming dynamics are going to be 
based on a mutual success on Turkish-Russian multilevel 
cooperation (Özdal, et al., 2013). According to their thesis 
the relations among Turkey and Russia have resisted the 
both side effects of the regional crisis on bilateral relations, 
and both nations have been compartmentalizing their 
relations in different areas. Even, social dynamics advance 
swiftly playing a catalyzing role.
This theory handles a different scenario due the 
unrestrained economic crisis all over the world focused on 
the developing economies, which are suffering nowadays the 
counter effects provoked by the European and the USA's 
financial crisis. On behalf of that, the last projections 
manifested by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund reflect a deep crisis in Russia related to the 
western economic sanctions and the setback on oil and gas 
prices. 
Focused on the oil prices effects the Turkish- Russian 
bilateral relations may confront a different level of 
cooperation because of the presence of external 
stakeholders, such as Iran, and the internal consequences 
derived from the economic crisis in the developing countries. 
Paying attention to their energy framework, Russia is still the 
main source of gas and oil towards Turkey. Reinforcing that 
idea, in 2010, both nations signed the Akkuyu's nuclear 
agreement, a movement that underlines the Turkish energy 
dependence from Gazprom and other Russian companies, as 
Novatek or Rosneft. 
The main aims and challenges for Russia are focused on 
controlling and to cope the European market. As the 
researcher Manfred Hefner has remarked, there are three 
1substantial aims that Russia wants to accomplish ; the first 
one, to get and to keep the operational control over transit 
routes. Thereby, bypassing Ukraine or reaching new routes 
through Belarus or Turkey are specific strategies for Moscow. 
The second strategy is focused on diversify and strengthen 
the exports infrastructure. i.e. underlining the establishment 
of nuclear capabilities and the deployment of nuclear energy 
Russian systems in the Middle East, and essentially in 
Turkey. Finally the last policy would be to minimize the role of 
transit countries. Notwithstanding, Moscow has no option in 
order to bypass every transit country. In this sense, they need 
to look for the most suitable option to avoid expensive 
investments and political instability. Belarus and its Yamal 
pipelines are for now the safest and profitable option, but the 
European sanctions and the Polish and Baltic attitudes 
against Russian policies in Ukraine have flamed fears and 
hatred against Russian expansionists policies and strategies 
in the former USSR countries.
Regarding the US Energy International Agency, Turkey 
has a deep energy dependency from Russia. Thereby It has 
been estimated that the Turkish natural gas dependency 
from Russia is roughly %70-80. Hence, the household and 
industrial prices are higher than other European countries.
Lasts years have manifested the Turkish economical 
development and, thus, It has to be borne in mind the high 
level of energy's consumption of oil, natural gas and also 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). This consumption has peaked 
up the Turkish energy dependency from Russia, provoking 
an increment of the household and industrial bills. 
Figure 1: Turkey Gas suppliers
Spite the negotiations carried out between both nations 
to come down gas prices, the Russian policy has been 
always unalterable reflecting historical differences and 
highlighting a complex roadmap in the forthcoming 
years. 
On this basis Russia has been negotiating in the last 
years strategic pipelines with Turkey. The main one has 
been the Blue Stream I, proposed in 1998 and 
accomplished in 2005. This project connects Russia and 
Turkey - from Izobilnoye to Samsun on the Turkish coast, 
and a further 300 miles link from Samsun to Ankara- 
supplying 9.5 billion cubic meters of gas. 
On the other hand, Blue Stream II, proposed several 
times between 2002, 2005 and 2009, was expected to 
become a direct competitor of the Nabucco pipeline, 
which led by European countries was fostered for 
warding off the Russian control supplying gas to Central 
and South Europe from Iraq, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
and Egypt. After several negotiations Blue Stream II was 
rejected and surrogated to Blue Stream I which is 
supplying gas from Russia to Turkey. 
South Stream pipeline has been till recently the most 
suitable and optimistic project launched by Russia in 
order to bypass the Ukrainian GTS (Gas Transit 
System).  That project was founded in 2012 by Russia 
and the European Commission for shattering the EU 
Trans-European Energy Network Nabucco's project 
which finally was abandoned in 2013 due a lack of 
economical viability after Shah Deniz consortium took 
the decision of investing in the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
over Nabucco. 
Turkey natural gas




Sourse: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International 











1 As Hefner (2012: 2) considered: “The major Russian strategic goals in the sphere of energy export is to guarantee security of energy flows to solvent 
customers in order to assure the needed cash flows to the Russian economy, but due to the importance of energy in the region's economies, politics and 
economics become often intertwined”.
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Thus South Stream would deliver 63 bcm of natural gas from 
Russia to the heart of Europe. According to the graphic the 
feasibility project settle down by the end of 2011 by Gazprom, 
the gas company announced the route of South Stream in 
Europe crossing Bulgaria, with a possible pipeline extension 
to Greece; Serbia, with extensions to Bosnia and Croatia; 
Hungary and Slovenia cutting the project at the Italian edge 
without a direct branch to Austria. Gazprom wiped out the 
idea to build a pipeline through Greece and the Adriatic Sea to 
Southern Italy.
2After signing bilateral agreements  with most of the 
European countries involved in that initiative, South Stream 
was petered out and rejected in 2014 due to the lack of 
investment related to the financial crisis in Europe and the 
lack of political understanding between Russia and several 
European countries. 
Despite the mentioned unaccomplished projects, the 
context emphasizes the increasing importance of Turkey as a 
mainstream corridor between Europe and Asia (Souleimanov & 
Kraus, 2012).  Indeed, there is a new project under negotiation 
between Russia and Turkey, the Turkish Stream. According to 
the lasts statements the project launched in December 2014 by 
Vladimir Putin has not already been accepted by Turkey. That 
initiative is not solid due two factors; on the one hand, the 
negotiations carried out by Turkey with Iran and the possible 
fostering of the Persian pipeline. And on the other hand, the 
American interests in order to press and diminish the Russian 
influence in the Middle East and especially in Syria. 
2  Russia signed intergovernmental agreements with: Bulgaria – January 18, 2008; Serbia – January 25, 2008; Hungary – February 28, 2008; Greece – April 
29, 2008; Slovenia – November 14, 2009; Croatia – March 2, 2010; Austria – April 24, 2010.
Figure 2: South's Stream feasibility project
Source: South Stream / Gazprom
Figure 3: Gas pipelines in 2018
Source: Tass Russian News
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Negotiations with Iran are at the International Court of 
Arbitration because beneath the last visit to Tehran on April 
th6 , 2015, the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
rejected the discount proposed by Iran assuming that the 
price is not convenient for Turkey. Both States will continue 
their negotiations using the arbitration system to reach a 
deal. Regarding unofficial versions, Turkey pays $490 for 
1,000 cubic meters of Iranian gas, $425 for Russian gas and 
$335 for Azeri gas. 
Going on this idea, Turkey is looking forward to coming 
down the Russian natural gas dependency. Turkey imports 
27 bcm of gas from Russia, 6 bcm from Azerbaijan, and 10 
bcm from Iran. Though it, and the sign of an agreement with 
Azerbaijan and the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline or the negotiations 
with Iran to access to the Iranian gas and oil, the Turkish 
energy security lingers on that the Russian dependency will 
be remained for the forthcoming years. As It shows the sign of 
a contract with Russia to build the first nuclear capability in 
Turkey and the projection of a second nuclear central. 
Russia and Turkey signed in 2010 the Akkuyu's 
Framework Agreement in accordance to build the first 
nuclear reactor in Mersin and strengthen the nuclear energy 
3in Turkey . That agreement, acutely criticized by 
environmental groups due the lack of safe protocols in an 
earthquake zone, has reinforced Russian control of Turkish 
energy security jeopardizing any possible Turkish energy 
step back in case of future tensions between both states.
Regarding the lasts estimations pointed out by several 
sources like the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, the economical growth manifested by Turkey during 
the last years is stagnant nowadays. According to that thesis, 
other developed nations such as India, China or Brazil are 
suffering setbacks with GDP levels substantially lower than 
the last years. Last official surveys indicates that Turkey is 
dealing with a 8% of inflation and its growth in 2015 would be 
less than 3% which assert the idea of urgent measures and 
reassure the country against an economic crisis.
3.  A new European roadmap
Europe undergoes and struggles with the crossroad and 
the blatant conflict in Ukraine and its energy 
consequences as the main corridor towards the EU. After 
the disruptions in 2006 in Ukraine and in 2009 in 
Belarus, the energy strategy has been focused on warding 
off its 28 countries from energy emergencies due conflicts 
between Russia and the Eastern States. The last political 
and economic sanctions imposed to Russia because the 
violations of the international conventions in Ukraine has 
impinged a financial crisis in the Russian economy and 
has affected like a deterrent effect on its aspirations of 
stepping down the Ukrainian sovereignty. Reinvigorating 
the sanctions against Russia, the European Commission 
approved the new Energy Security Strategy on which the 
European policies tested the consequences under two 
circumstances; 
· a complete halt of Russian gas imports to the EU;
· a disruption of Russian gas imports through the 
Ukrainian transit route; 
    
Estimations underline the difficulties that Europe and 
especially the Eastern countries would confront if they 
should handle their energy security necessities with an 
absolute halt of Russian gas imports. Depending on the 
forthcoming months and the evolution of the Ukrainian 
conflict and its peaceful agreement, Minsk II, the 
crossroad that the EU has to deal with would change their 
strategies. According to the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) the European natural gas demand will rise from 536 
bcm in 2010 to 592-640 bcm in 2030, an increase of 10-
19%. 
On the other side, Eurogas Statistical Report 2014 
estimates that gas demand across the European Union 
4dropped by 9% in 2014, compared with 2013 . In the first 
half of 2014 demand decreased by 18%, compared with the 
same period in 2013. Eurogas Statistical Report 2014 
estimates that 27% of the European Union's demand of gas is 
supplied by Russia. Norway is the second supplier with an 
estimated 21% of gas imports, followed up by Algeria 8% and 
5Qatar 6% . Indicators, besides, settles that different 
countries in Africa and the Middle East supply gas and LNG 
to the European Union. 
The Energy Security Strategy establishes a group of short 
3 Russia and Turkey signed a cooperation Agreement in Ankara on May 12, 2010. The Agreement agrees on the construction of a nuclear power plant 
consisting of four power units of NPP-2006 project with VVER-1200 reactors of total capacity 4.800 MW in Mersin. See more  information about that 
agreement at  http://www.akkunpp.com/akkuyu-nuclear-jsc#sthash.gEoGm8M4.dpuf  
4 Eurogas points out that in 2013, primary energy consumption (PEC) in the European Union (EU) decreased by 0.9% compared with 2012, to 1 675.8 
million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe). Consumption of natural gas decreased by 1.5%, oil by 2.2%, solid fossil fuels (i.e. coal and peat) decreased by 2.7%. 
Consumption of nuclear electricity decreased slightly by 0.3% between 2012 and 2013. The consumption of hydropower increased by 11.0%, other 
renewable energy sources by 5.0% and the category others, including heat, increased by 16.0%. Statistical Report (2014: 10).
5  According to Eurogas Statistical Report, the share of gas from Qatar in EU supplies, the EU's main LNG supplier, decreased from 6% in 2012 to 5% in 
2013. Ibidem. pp. 6-7.
Figure 4: Gas imports towards the European Union
Source: Eurogas Statistical Report 2014
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term measures in order to bypass the halt of the Russian 
6energy in Europe . The initiatives are 1) the EU should follow 
a market-based approach to guarantee secure supplies. 
Interventionist measures by governments should be avoided; 
2) countries should increase energy coordination with each 
other, including through the maximisation of interconnector 
capacity and the removal of restrictions to cross-border 
energy trade; 3) short-term behavioral changes should be 
enacted to boost energy efficiency and lower demand; 4) the 
EU's Gas Coordination Group should continuously monitor 
developments in the gas supply;
Besides, the Strategy would foster long term measures 
in order to diversify its sources and ensure the energy market 
system within the European Union. Likewise, there are five 
milestones that should be taken under consideration; 1) 
Increasing energy efficiency and reaching the proposed 2030 
energy and climate goals. Priorities in this area should focus 
on buildings and industry, which use 40% and 25% of total 
EU energy respectively. It is also important to help 
consumers lower their energy consumption, for example 
with clear billing information and smart energy meters. 2) 
Increasing energy production in the EU and diversifying 
supplier countries and routes. This includes further 
deployment of renewables, sustainable production of fossil 
fuels, and safe nuclear where the option is chosen. It also 
entails negotiating effectively with current major energy 
partners such as Russia, Norway, or Saudi Arabia, as well as 
new partners such as countries in the Caspian Basin region.
In addition, 3) Completing the internal energy market 
and building missing infrastructure links to quickly respond 
to supply disruptions and re-direct energy across the EU to 
where it is needed; 4) Speaking with one voice in external 
energy policy, including having EU countries inform the 
European Commission early-on with regards to planned 
agreements with non-EU countries that may affect the EU's 
security of supply; 5) Strengthening emergency and 
solidarity mechanisms and protecting critical infrastructure. 
This includes more coordination between EU countries to 
use existing storage facilities, develop reverse flows, conduct 
risk assessments, and put in place security of supply plans at 
regional and EU level.
Concerning the European emergency mechanisms 
Norway has exported 29.2 billion cubic metres (bcm) 
towards Europe in the first quarter of 2015. The data reflects 
that imports from Russia have been decreased to 19.8 bcm, 
turning out the sempiternal European energy dependency 
from Russian gas. According to Gassco and Gazprom, 
Norwegian imports increased from 34% to 38% in 2014 and 
It seems that in 2015 this situation can get worse for Russia. 
This strategy confirms the economic and political sanctions 
against Russia related to the geopolitical row over Russia's 
annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region and the sovereign 
violations committed in the East of Ukraine. 
Pipelines are locked from Russia to Ukraine due to the 
tough and complex negotiations that both countries have 
been fulfilling lately. Norway has changed the flows to 
Ukraine and even the Gas Transit System from Ukraine to 
Europe has redirected its gas flows and actually Slovenia, 
Slovakia and Hungary are supplying gas to Ukraine in order 
to fill up the gas storage for the next winter.
The establishment of the major transport capacity 
system to Ukraine through the Budince interconnection gas 
transit, mechanism stipulated by the European Commission 
thand the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 28  April 
2014, allows the gas transmission and to flow gas between 
the Slovak transmission system operator Eustream and its 
7counterpart, Ukrtransgaz .
Negotiations between Ukraine and Russia have been 
frozen until the Stockholm Arbitration Court will decide 
whether the overcharging price that Ukraine had paid to Russia 
after the negotiations in 2009 and 2012 are fair or, whether on 
the contrary, It will affect the trade regulations established 
within their bilateral agreement (Rodchenko, 2015).
On the one hand, Ukrainian Gas company, Naftogaz, and 
Russian Gas Consortium, Gazprom, have lodged cases 
against each other within the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce to judge whether one or 
the another have breached the contract signed in 2009 by 
Ukrainian former President, Yulia Tymoshenko. According to 
that agreement renegotiated in 2010 under the Kharkov Fleet 
Accord, by the former President of Ukraine, Viktor 
Yanukovich, and former President of Russia, Dmitry 
Medvedev, Naftogaz agreed to pay $268.5 per 1,000 cubic 
meters; after the last disputes in April 2014, albeit, Gazprom 
and Russia modified the agreement and cancelled the 
discount increasing the price to $485 per 1,000 cubic meters. 
Under those discussions there is a substantial matter: 
the control of the Gas Transit System towards Europe that 
Russia wants to tie and include within a new gas agreement. 
With this movement Moscow undergoes the idea of 
restraining and managing the GTS and to wipe out in the 
forthcoming years any possible conflict with Ukraine such as 
transit country. Since 2012 Naftogaz has been negotiating the 
discount of its gas prices signed in 2009 by Yulia 
Tymoshenko. That agreement took place under an 
emergency situation because the continuous conflicts with 
Russia and the disruption in 2009 of the gas flows to Ukraine 
but as well to Europe. Naftogaz agreed under those unfair 
circumstances of paying an expensive bill of $485 per 1,000 
cubic meters without any support by the European Union. 
Forthcoming negotiations with Moscow revealed 
political and economic prosecutions in Ukraine jailing to 
every single person opposed to the Russian carrot and stick 
negotiations in order to control the Ukrainian GTS. The 
stepped down former President Viktor Yanukovich was 
negotiating a new discount but the Russian intransigence in 
order to decrease the gas prices or even the gas minimum 
flows to Ukraine provoked an economic and financial war, 
affecting for instance the prices of cheese or wheat exported 
towards Russia. 
The successive negotiations in 2011, 2012 and 2013 
were under the Russian threats of disrupting the gas through 
Ukraine and under the obstacles of renegotiating every year 
the minimum flows of gas that Ukraine could use. Following 
the 2009's bilateral contract, there were several clauses 
related to the negotiation of gas flows year by year and, 
indeed, the discount of their payments, but Gazprom 
dragged out the negotiations, delaying the process until the 
expiration of the deadline dates for that negotiation. 
Under that situation and the Naftogaz negatives to sell 
the control of its GTS, the Russian Government agreed at the 
end of 2014 to resume gas supplies to Ukraine and to arrange 
a winter package temporary gas price until the end of March 
2015. Stockholm Tribunal has to determine whether the 
prices for those gas flows and the debt are under the 
arrangement or if Naftogaz or Gazprom broke and breached 
the contract. Probably the hearing will begin in 2016. 
In the other hand, the Arbitration Institute of the 
6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. European Energy Security Strategy /* COM/2014/0330 final. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330
7 Based on the solution which is presented in the MoU, the existing and unused Vojany pipeline at Veľké Kapušany on the Slovakian side will be modernised 
during a short construction period. There is a clear perspective that 22 million cubic meters of gas a day can flow from Slovakia to Ukraine via the Vojany 
pipeline as from autumn 2014. This corresponds to approximately 8 billion cubic meters a year. Eustream will swiftly check some technical details in order to 
be able to confirm the implementation of this solution within a few weeks. Should this option unexpectedly prove not to be feasible, the 2 alternative would be 
to start with a smaller volume and scale the pipeline up to 22 million cubic meters a day until April 2015. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
th487_en.htm [Consulted on 30  Aug 2015].
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Stockholm Chamber of Commerce must determine the 
breach of the Natural Gas Sale and Purchase Contract No KP 
for the period of 2009-2019. The Supply Contract was 
broken in June 2014 when Russia cut off the gas flows to 
Ukraine due to the aforementioned disputes related to the 
gas prices and the minimum flows that Naftogaz might use 
from Russia. For that shortfall of the gas flows Naftogaz has 
lodged to Gazprom and claimed a compensation for the 
8transit contract breach of $6.2 billions.  
Naftogaz's claim is based on the June's 2014 disruption 
of gas and the cancellation of the “take-or-pay” provisions; 
besides, the Ukrainian national Consortium seeks for 
revising the aforementioned gas prices calculation 
mechanism and recover $6 billions of overpayment for the 
gas supplied since 2010. On the contrary, Gazprom claims 
$4.5 billions that have to be paid in accordance to the unpaid 
debt for the natural gas flows supplied from 2009 to 2014.
The sue lodged to the Arbitration Stockholm, besides, 
contains the “take-or-pay” provisions related to the 
minimum flows towards Ukraine. On this basis, Naftogaz has 
been required to pay for 41.6 billion of cubic meters as the 
minimum consumption regardless if Ukraine receives less 
than that quantity. For example, Naftogaz roughly imported 
28.1 billion of cubic meters in 2013, while in 2012, the 
imports were 32.9 billions. Allegations are based on the 
ongoing conditions of the liberalized European gas market, 
under which the “take-or-pay” provisions become abusive 
and out of the European Competence market. Thus 
Gazprom's conditions and clauses would be classified such 
as abusives and the lodge introduced by Naftogaz is looking 
forward to compensating the breakdowns. 
At the same time, Naftogaz is trying to repeal the Contract 
for Volumes, Terms and Conditions for Transit of the Natural 
Gas along the Territory of Ukraine 2009-2019, as was executed 
in 2009. The Transit Contract signed amid Naftogaz and 
Gazprom would infringe the Energy Accession European 
Protocol and the implementation of the Third Energy Packet. 
Upon the Protocol, the new Ukrainian legislation should revoke 
the aforementioned Transit Contract. On behalf of that, Naftogaz 
would derived its obligations to the Ukrainian consortium 
Ukranian's Transmission System Gas Operator (Ukrtransgaz). 
As a result, Ukrtransgaz would control and assume the GTS 
and the Transit Contract with Moscow. Notwithstanding, and 
regarding several clauses within the mentioned contract, there is 
no specification about if the contract may be executed for 
Naftogaz or Ukrtransgaz or whether the Transit Contract can be 
extinguished due to the contract contravenes the Ukrainian and 
European legislation in terms of a Liberalized and Competence 
free Market. The Arbitration Court of Stockholm must settle 
down a sentence in this respect. 
Beneath all the disputes emerge three important 
questions; the first one, and the milestone on the overall 
situation, there is a clear intention of controlling the 
Ukrainian GTS. Russia has been trying to negotiate and 
access to control the GTS in repetitive and several 
opportunities. Every renegotiation of the Supply and Transit 
Contracts stipulated the Russian GTS control. Despite every 
attempt and every threat, the Ukrainian Government is aware 
about its GTS' importance in order to control the European 
Market and the Russian oil and exports to Europe. 
According to the independent consultant company Baker 
Tilly Ukraine, probably a worthy estimations of the Ukrainian 
GTS may be close to $29 billions. A consortium between 
Naftogaz, Gazprom and an European energy company, 
probably ENI, GDF Suez or E.ON Ruhrgas have been discussing 
for the last 10 years the possible investment of billions of dollars 
in order to upgrade the GTS system. Moreover, and in spite the 
Joint Venture would be a great opportunity for Gazprom and 
Russia, the counter positions and different interests in order to 
invest in South Stream, Nord Stream or the Ukrainian GTS 
have been always a counterbalance for Russia and the 
European Union (Hafner, 2012). With the South Stream's 
cancellation probably Russia and the European Union will try to 
renegotiate a Joint Venture with Ukrtransgaz and invest 
between 6 to 8 billions of dollars on this project. 
Naftogaz pointed out in 2010 that its GTS modernization 
and renovation would cost $8.5 billions ensuring the 
accomplishment of its transit obligations, the annual loading of 
120 bcm and the modernization aimed on capacity, reliability 
and efficiency enhancement of Ukrainian GTS. Its estimations 
establish that only the creation of Nord Stream would suppose 
the investment of $55 billions, $63 billions for South Stream 
and $31 billions of investments on Nabucco's project. 
Hence, and regarding those provisions, Russia would pay 
Figure 5: Ukrainian GTS Renovation
Source: Ministry of Energy of Ukraine/ Naftogaz
8 According to Rodchenko (2015), the Supply Contract itself provides for a possible change of the price calculation mechanism and contains the price re-
opener clause. Within this context, Naftogaz's claims may be accepted by the tribunal as justifiable and fair.
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more if wants to launch new projects, like South Stream or 
Turkish Stream, than supporting the renovation and 
modernization of the Ukrainian GTS. On this basis, It's 
compulsory to remind that Ukraine has ruled out any 
Russian attempt to control the GTS. Even, if Moscow agrees 
to develop the Turkish or the South Stream pipelines or any 
other future project, the investments would be more and 
there will not be any guarantee of controlling the pipelines 
without the meddling of Turkey or the European Union 
States. The final aim of bypassing the Ukrainian GTS is to 
export gas to Europe and the European Commission has 
warned to Russia about the consequences if its troops 
intervene in Ukraine after signing the Minsk II Peaceful 
Agreement. 
The complexity of this energy puzzle is utterer whether 
the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is still ongoing and 
without a clear determination. In spite the ceasefire, accorded 
in Minsk II, the tensions are still latent in the East of Ukraine, 
highlighting Donetsk and Mariupol, cities close to Crimea and 
just in the middle of a possible corridor connecting Russia 
and Crimea. 
The second circumstance that remarks the Russian 
hopes is the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent 
9State . This regional organization looks forward to rejoining 
the former USSR Republics under the Russian control. CIS 
would have supranational powers reinforcing the Russian 
sphere and empowering its intentions of having a major 
control within international political and economic 
negotiations. Most of the former Central Asian states have 
ratified their integration on the Commonwealth, but the 
Baltic States haven't even agreed to negotiate about its 
incorporation. Ukraine has not ratified any chapter and 
works only as a participating state but It's not a member state. 
The last situation that warns and threats the Russian 
dominance is the negotiations between Turkey and Iran in 
order to import natural gas and oil as It was mentioned 
previously. Those negotiations are under the Arbitration of a 
Court but the agreement between Tehran and Ankara would 
impinge the construction of the Turkish Stream or any other 
pipeline towards Europe. Especially beyond the failures of 
South Stream and Nabucco. 
If the European Energy Strategy establishes the pillars 
and structure of a reliable security system, there are different 
approaches in Asia that can stimulate and strengthen the 
European Union energy puzzle. On behalf of that, the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed  between the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, the P5+1 and the European Union 
recognizes a setback in order to normalize the diplomatic, 
political and economical relations amid Iran, the United 
Nations, the USA and the European Union. In spite there are 
still several sharp edges to be shaped within the Joint Plan 
Action, after years of negotiations, rolling backs and a long 
term and tough process, the agreement  foresees a win-win 
roadmap for softening the tensions in the Middle East 
10region .
This agreement would pave the way to normalize and to 
smooth the trade sanctions against Iran affecting the oil and 
gas imports. The negotiations that Turkey and Iran carry out 
in order to set up a corridor towards Europe mean a stimulus 
for Europe. Notwithstanding, and in spite all the positive 
approaches and the ambitious agenda formulated by JCPOA, 
the possibility of importing gas by the Persian pipeline from 
Iran to Europe is still a project without a clear definition. In 
the case of positives steps monitoring the agreement, the 
delay to create all the necessary infrastructures and the sign 
of a trade Treaty with Iran would remain for a long time. 
  Albeit, there are shapes that can delay and to drag out 
11the sign of any agreement between Europe and Iran . One of 
those shapes is Israel and its diplomatic ties with several 
States in Europe. Israel has shown its reluctance to that 
comprehensive approach. Jerusalem does not want a 
strengthened and vigorous country such as the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in the Middle East. Their fears about a strong 
actor supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in 
Palestine would impinge a rollback to their enemies in the 
region and can back the idea of the Palestinian recognition as 
a State. 
4.  Final remarks
After the 2006 and 2009 Russian energy disruptions towards 
Europe, due to the conflicts with Ukraine and Belarus, Russia 
tries to find out a safe way to rule the European energy 
market. Regarding that, and above all highlighting the 
ongoing tensions with Ukraine and the Eastern countries, the 
Turkish hub is more meaningful than years ago. 
Bearing in mind the everlasting and difficult 
roadmap in order to find a solution in Ukraine, the 
Bosphorus Strait and the Black Sea have been underlined as 
the main energy transit paths from Russia to South and 
Central Europe. Indeed, after the recent Iranian Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the P5+1 and 
the European Union, which built up a new framework in the 
Middle East and the region, Iran hitherto ratifies its position 
such as energy hub in Eurasia and jeopardize to diminish the 
Russian gas monopoly in the region and keen the Iranian 
proposal to sell gas to the European Union.
The European political and economic sanctions 
against Russia are modifying the geopolitical spectrum in the 
Middle East and the energy relations between every political 
actor. The bloodsheds in Syria and the UN resolutions 
looking for solutions to that conflict are connected to every 
single step that the European Union and the United States are 
giving in this conflictive region. The geopolitical chess, that 
Russia and the USA are playing using different tools, like 
NATO, the Syrian conflict, the Palestinian everlasting peace 
process, the Iraqi stabilization or the Afghanistan 
peacebuilding and the establishment of a Rule of Law, 
remarks a back and forths game that probably will affect 
Turkey as It is going on in Ukraine. 
There are several consequences for Russia after all. 
On the one hand Russian's energy and political prevalence 
may be come down in Europe and the Middle East. One of the 
reasons -or geopolitical tricks- has been Vladimir's Putin lack 
of cooperation regarding the Syrian conflict. Despite the fact 
that the UNSC was looking for Russian cooperation in order 
9  Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in December 1991. In the adopted Declaration the participants of the Commonwealth declared 
their interaction on the basis of sovereign equality. At this moment CIS unites to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Notwithstanding, Georgia withdrew its participation in 2008, Turkmenistan is an Associate State 
and Ukraine, has not ratified any Convention
10 The JCPOA settles down a cut off all potential nuclear weapons and reshuffles any atomic intention towards civil and peaceful nuclear purposes. 
According to that, Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges; indeed,  Iran will set back from having about 19,000 
installed to 6,104 installed and all excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as 
replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
11  Not only Israel has shown its doubts and opposition to the agreement, but as well several Gulf countries are lately pointing out that despite the 
 positiveness exposed, the GCC needs a comprehensive, verifiable deal that cuts off the pathways to a nuclear weapon.Likewise, the emir of Qatar, Sheikh 
Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, in a meeting with the President of the United States, Barack Obama,  welcomed the agreement and hopes “that this will be a key 
factor for stability in the region”. Meanwhile, the Saudi foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir remarked in that briefing that “Saudi Arabia welcome any deal that 
stops Iran from having a nuclear capability and this is what we have been assured by the US and by the other P5+1 countries – that all pathways to a bomb 
thwill be closed to Iran.” BORGER, Julian (2015). “Iran nuclear deal: the winners and losers”. The Guardian. [Consulted on 30  May 2015] 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/03/lausanne-nuclear-deal-winners-and-losers
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to step down the Syrian President, Bashad Al Asad, and to 
stop the bloodshed in Syria, Vladimir Putin has not only 
ruled out any peaceful agreement,  but as well has supported 
a long term conflict. So, similar motivations is finding the 
European Union sanctioning to Russia and trying to punish 
smoothly its energy market. 
On the other hand, the Iran's Comprehensive Plan, 
linked to every step that Moscow is following up in Ukraine 
and Syria, reshuffles the geopolitical pivot in the region. 
Iranian and western economic and political interests might 
shatter the Russian dominance in the Middle East. The USA's 
Heartland interests destabilise the chess game and create 
new paradigms and conflicts in a shaky region. The rings 
surrounding the heartland have been affected for the 
American and Russian interests in every country. Turkey 
probably is the next chess game because of its strategic 
situation between Europe and Asia. The Black Sea's 
management, as It fortifies the reason for Russia to ratify its 
control over Crimea, modifies the European and American 
perception about Turkey as the main political, energy and 
economic hub-gate from Asia to Europe. 
Turkey, as Ukraine or Georgia or the Caspian Sea's 
countries are the next focus of conflict in the forthcoming 
years. If someone is able to tackle and handle this ring, It can 
be possible to destabilise the interests of the rest of the actors 
and holders. That's why Turkey and its strategic energy plan 
can determine and balance the control of this convulse part of 
the world. 
Indeed, Turkey will not cut off any possible path and the 
success or failure of the Turkish Stream will run away 
parallel to the negotiations that Turkey and Iran are carrying 
on in order to extend the ongoing gas agreement. Whether the 
President of Turkey is able to double the Iranian supplies and 
to get a notable discount, the Turkish Stream would shrink. 
In this sense the Iranian interest of selling gas to the EU is 
going to strive in favour of Turkish interests. On the other 
hand, if the negotiations with Iran fail, the projection of 
creating the Turkish Stream will rebirth. 
This paper emphasized the idea of looking for new 
energy sources and to explore new markets such as central 
Asian countries in order to diversify and to achieve lower 
natural gas and LNG prices. On behalf of that, the new oil and 
gas wells found in the Kurdish region (Mills, 2013) and 
especially the forecast of gas and oil reserves within the 
Caspian Sea basin will underpin the settlement of diversified 
agreements with Azerbaijan, Iran and the Middle East 
countries.  
Geopolitically, Kurdish oil and gas wells reinforces the 
possibility to settle down diverse and independent sources 
for nourishing Europe with gas and oil. Turkey would 
represent an important asset in order to build the pipelines 
from Iraq. On the hand, Turkey might import gas from Erbil, 
and on the hand, execute the construction of a stream 
towards Europe. As Geopolitics of Energy Project Belfer 
Center points out, It has been estimated that Iraq possesses 
112 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas, which means the 
eleventh largest reserves in the world. Moreover, as with its 
oil reserves, Iraq's gas reserves numbers are likely 
significantly underestimated. According to the EIA, 
“probable Iraqi reserves have been estimated at 275-300 Tcf, 
and work is currently underway by several IOCs and 
independents to accurately update hydrocarbon reserve 
numbers. (Elliot & Beryl, 2012, p. 9).
Notwithstanding, and in spite the estimations for 
exploiting the Kurdish gas, the political situation, 
overwhelmed by the sovereign project of independence of 
Erbil and the Kurdish region from Iraq, is delaying any 
possible advance in order to take up to exploit the oil and gas 
in Erbil using the maximum possible efforts. Indeed, the 
instability in the region and the presence of terrorist groups 
can reshuffle the economic and political efforts fulfilled by the 
USA in Iraq. The ongoing instability will slow down the 
impact from Exxon and American companies in Erbil and the 
North of Iraq. 
Iraq has the potential to become a major exporter of 
natural gas, especially to Europe. Some estimations situate 
Iraq's export potential by 2030 at 0.5 to 1.1 Tcf of natural gas 
per year, which would help meet Europe's energy demand 
requirements in the future and lower its dependence on 
Russian gas. This possibility reinforces the idea that Iran, 
Iraq or different countries in Central Asia can foster a 
different approach with Turkey and to try to create a gas flow 
to Europe.
To conclude, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997, p. 46) asserted 
that “neither the West nor Russia can afford to lose Ukraine to 
its strategic and economic adversary. If Moscow regains 
control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major 
resources as well as access to the Black Sea, Russia 
automatically again regains the wherewithal to become a 
powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia. 
Ukraine's loss of independence would have immediate 
consequences for Central Europe, transforming Poland into 
the geopolitical pivot on the eastern frontier of a united 
Europe”. Holding on this asseveration and extending that, 
this author asserts that whether Moscow strives and takes 
over the Black Sea and the utter control of the energy hub to 
Europe, Russia will curb the USA heartland geopolitic's 
theory and will restrain the Europeans aspirations of 
handling its energy security. Turkey should be an empowered 
actor and take advantage of this geopolitical situation. 
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